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The Long Shadow of Aristotelian Naturalism in the Development of Ethics 
* Published in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18:1 (2010) 
 
 
A critical notice of Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: Volume I: From Socrates to the Reformation.  . 
Oxford University Press, 2007.  Pp. vii + 812.  ISBN 978198242673.  Hbk £55.00 ($125.00). 
 
If required to give a title in the style of 17th and 18th century works, Terence Irwin would have called his 
ambitious and deeply rewarding historical survey of moral philosophy,  
 
The Development of Ethics 
being a selective historical and critical study of 
moral philosophy in the Socratic tradition 
with special attention to Aristotelian naturalism 
its formation, elaboration, criticism, and defence. (p. 1) 
 
So descrLEHGWKLVDUWLFXODWHV,UZLQ¶VPDLQDSSURDFKWRWKHKLVWRU\RIPRUDOSKLORVRSK\2YHUWKUHHVHSDUDWH
volumes, Irwin provides an extended discussion of moral philosophy as a discipline systematically engaged in 
a Socratic method of inquiry which reacts to different aspects of Aristotelian naturalism.  The first volume 
begins with Socrates and ends with the Reformation, covering major classical Greek and Christian 
philosophical movements; the second volume discusses early modern philosophy from Suarez to Rousseau 
and different approaches towards natural law; the third volume covers the Enlightenment and modernity, from 
Kant to Rawls.  The Socratic method and Aristotelian naturalism are the unifying strands throughout all three 
books.  I here focus on the first volume. 
As a renowned classicist, Irwin provides a magisterial and critically engaged account of the major 
Greek philosophic schools, from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, to the Stoics, as well as other lesser-known 
schools, such as the Cyrenaics and Cynics.  Given his main unifying theme, a large portion of the book 
focuses on Aristotle and the Christian Aristotelianism of Aquinas, containing sympathetic and detailed 
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discussion of themes such as eudaimoniaQDWXUHDQGYLUWXH  ,UZLQ¶VWUHDWPHQWRI$ULVWRWOH is sophisticated 
and echoes many themes from his earlier book, $ULVWRWOH¶V )LUVW 3ULQFLSOHV.  ,UZLQ¶V FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RQ
Aristotelian naturalism, however, confines too narrowly his exegesis of Christian thinkers and the voluntarist 
natural law tradition.  PDUWLFXODUO\ FRQWURYHUVLDO LV ,UZLQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI $XJXVWLQH DV ZRUNLQJ EURDGO\
ZLWKLQ UDWKHU WKDQ DJDLQVW WKH $ULVWRWHOLDQ WUDGLWLRQ  ,UZLQ¶V FRQWHQWLRXV UHDGLQJ VWHPV IURP XQGHUO\LQJ
weaknesses with his overall methodology; these I discuss in what IROORZV  6HFWLRQ , H[DPLQHV ,UZLQ¶V
methodological approach to the history of ethics.  Section II illustrates the drawbacks of this approach by 




According to Irwin, the Socratic dialectical method of moral philosophy incorporates both historical reflection 
and constructive philosophical criticism.  Irwin describes his project as following and participating within this 
Socratic tradition; he aims to pay careful attention to historical specificities, balanced with critical analysis of 
the actual philosophical arguments.  Those philosophers who share his own commitment to the historical 
GLPHQVLRQRIWKH6RFUDWLFPHWKRGDUH,UZLQ¶VIRFXVLQKLVERRN 
 
I present them as participants in a collective effort to apply this method to the past and present of moral 
philosophy.  [...]  But I do not simply intend to describe a collective Socratic inquiry in its historical aspect.  I 
also try to evaluate it, and therefore to take part in it.  In this respect I do not draw a sharp distinction between 
the method of a historian of moral philosophy and the method of a moral philosopher.  It is more difficult to 
engage in a constructive conversation with an interlocutor whose startLQJSRLQWGLIIHUVZLGHO\IURPRQH¶VRZQ
than to argue with someone with whom one already has a lot in common.  But if one can find common ground 
with interlocutors who begin from widely different presuppositions, one may have grounds for greater 
confidence in the conclusions reached from the common ground.  (p. 3) 
 
The philosophical dimension to the Socratic method Irwin understands as a process of constructive, critical 
dialogue, designed to identify puzzles and inconsistencies in our prevailing moral beliefs and views.  This 
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dialogue facilitates progress towards a moral outlook that is based on improved, more defensible philosophical 
DUJXPHQWV7KHSKLORVRSKHU¶VWDVNWKHUHIRUHLVWRuse his or her MXGJHPHQWLQVHDUFKRI³WKHEHVWVWDWHPHQW
we can find oI WKHLUHVVHQWLDOSRLQWVDQGRIWKHLUEHDULQJRQSRLQWVUDLVHGE\ODWHUSKLORVRSKHUV´S $Q
optimistic outlook underpins the Socratic method, where the implicit assumption is that we can learn from the 
criticism and progressive refinement of our morDOYLHZVDQGHWKLFDOWKHRULHV,Q,UZLQ¶VZRUGV³,DVVXPHZH
can criticize an earlier theory constructively from the point of view of a later theory, and that in many cases a 
defender of an earlier theory can reasonably be expected to learn something from the criticisms of later 
WKHRULVWV´S$FFRUGLQJWR,UZLQWKHKLVWRULFDODVSHFWRIWKH6RFUDWLFGLDORJXHOHDGVTXLWHQDWXUDOO\WRWKH
philosophical method: points of convergence between different theories, regardless of historical period, point 
to WKH FULWLFDO HYROXWLRQ RI FHUWDLQ HQGXULQJ SKLORVRSKLFDO LGHDV  ³>'@HHSHU H[DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH DSSDUHQWO\
various and conflicting tendencies in ethical theory will reveal some considerable agreement on the main 
principles; and this degree of agreement will FRQVWLWXWH VRPHDUJXPHQW IRU WKHSULQFLSOHV´ S  6SHFLILF
philosophical themes or dilemmas persist throughout history, though these may be articulated differently 
depending on intellectual or cultural context.  Historical reflection helps us to detect VRPH ³UHODWLYHO\
SHUPDQHQWSULQFLSOHV´SVXFKDVIRU,UZLQWKHVXEVWDQWLYHWKHPHRI$ULVWRWHOLDQQDWXUDOLVP 
It may indeed be true that the Socratic method points to how philosophy contains interrelated 
historical and argumentative strands.  Whether Irwin successfully balances these two constituent strands is, 
however, debatable. Genuine historical engagement may be sacrificed in the interest of constructing a unified 
and coherent philosophical argument.  Irwin says explicitly that his study does not follow the Cantabrigian 
method.  This approach towards the history of ideas, made famous by the Cambridge school, emphasises the 
significance of the social and political context to our understanding of historical texts; for without 
consideration and explanation of this context, we are liable to misunderstand historical thinkers or themes.  
Despite the fact that Irwin devotes little space to even perfunctory explanations of salient historical factors 
which may indeed intrude on philosophical ideas ± particularly in the case of Medieval Christianity ± he 
FODLPVWKDW³>W@KH&DQWDEULJLDQDSSURDFKDQGP\DSSURDFKDUHQRWFRPSHWLWRUVWKH\VKRXOGVXSSOHPHQWHDFK
RWKHUDQGRIIHUVRPHPXWXDOLOOXPLQDWLRQ´S%XWLWUHPDLQVDQRSHQTXHVWLRQKRZWKHVHWZo approaches 
mutually support each other.    
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)LUVW RI DOO D PRUH &DQWDEULJLDQ DSSURDFK ZRXOG ILQG VXVSHFW ,UZLQ¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW HQGXULQJ
philosophical principles, like Aristotelian naturalism, can indeed be found throughout the history of ideas.  
Irwin DLPV WR ³FRQVLGHU REMHFWLRQV WR $ULVWRWHOLDQ QDWXUDOLVP DQG GLVFXVV WKH QRQ-Aristotelian or anti-
$ULVWRWHOLDQYLHZVWKDWVHHNWRFRUUHFWWKHHUURUVDQGRPLVVLRQVRIWKH$ULVWRWHOLDQRXWORRN´S8QGHUWKLV
broad thematic umbrella are schools of thought as diverse as the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, Sceptics, the 
Augustinian tradition, voluntarists such as Scotus and Ockham, and trends within philosophy which originate 
in Hobbes, Hume, and Kant.  Essentially, the history of ethics is envisaged as one long debate between 
$ULVWRWHOLDQ QDWXUDOLVP DQG LWV FULWLFV  ,UZLQ VWDWHV ³>V@LQFH , GR QRW WKLQN WKH\ GLVORGJH $ULVWRWHOLDQ
naturalism, it is all the more important to try to present their position fairly and sympathetically, so that one 
can see where they have raised legitimate points that a defender of Aristotle ought to concede, where their 
FULWLFLVPVUHVWRQPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGZKHUH$ULVWRWHOLDQQDWXUDOLVPKDVDUHDVRQDEOHDQVZHUWRWKHP´S
5).   
It might be the case that seen through the lens of Aristotelian naturalism the history of ethics is both 
interesting and informative.  It can also function, however, as an excessively restrictive and misleading lens 
which commits what Quentin Skinner calls the ³reification of GRFWULQHV´1, and consequently fails to do proper 
justice to the diversity and richness of the development of moral philosophy.  8QGHU ,UZLQ¶V WUHDWPHQW, 
Aristotelian naturalism LV LQGDQJHURI³EHFRP>LQJ@K\SRVWDWL]HG LQWR DQHQWLW\´2, where thinkers who have 
diverged sharply, or fail to engage with Aristotelian naturalism, are nonetheless understood as part of the same 
developmental, philosophical story.3  For example, Irwin believes that both Aristotelian and Kantian 
DSSURDFKHVWRZDUGVPRUDOLW\DUH³QRWPXWXDOO\DQWDJRQLVWLFDQGWKDWDSUoper modification of the Aristotelian 
SRVLWLRQRXJKW WR LQFRUSRUDWH VRPHRI WKHPDMRU.DQWLDQFODLPV´ S (YHQ LIZHJUDQW ,UZLQ WKDW VRPH
µUHODWLYHO\SHUPDQHQWSULQFLSOHV¶FDQLQGHHGEHGLVFRYHUHGLQWKHKLVWRU\RILGHDVWKHLQWULQVLFSKLORVRSKLFDO 
indeed moral value, of melding together different ethical approaches is debatable.  Both historical traditions 
bring something unique to moral philosophy, and contribute in distinctive ways to the collective pool of 
philosophical resources which contemporary thinkers can now draw upon for support or inspiration.  It seems 
to me we inevitably reduce the size, variety, and richness of that pool once we search for perennial 
                                                          
1
 4XHQWLQ6NLQQHU³0HDQLQJDQG+LVWRU\LQWKH+LVWRU\RI,GHDV´History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): p. 11. 
2
 Ibid., p. 10. 
3
 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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philosophical themes, in hopes of achieving an arbitrary historical linearity and coherence.  In this respect, 
Skinner is right to insist on the philosophical and moral value of a more variegated, contextual approach to the 
KLVWRU\ RI HWKLFV LQVRIDU DV WKLV PHWKRG ³KHOS>V@ WR UHYHDO >«@ QRW WKH HVVHQWLDO VDPHQHVV EXW UDWKHU WKH
essential YDULHW\RIYLDEOHPRUDODVVXPSWLRQVDQGSROLWLFDOFRPPLWPHQWV´4 
To be fair, Irwin is correct that Aristotelian naturalism casts a long shadow in the history of moral 
SKLORVRSK\\HWDVKHKLPVHOIDFNQRZOHGJHVLQWKHHDUO\PRGHUQHUDµQDWXUDOLVP¶WDNHVD new form, and one 
ZKLFK GRHV QRW UHIOHFW WKH $ULVWRWHOLDQ FRQFHSWLRQ  ,UZLQ¶V XVH RI WKH WHUP µQDWXUDOLVP¶ GLIIHUV IURP WKH
contemporary Moore-ian meaning, as well as from what I would consider the more early modern connotation, 
ZKHUH³ZH>«@WU\WRXQGHUVWDQGPRUDOLW\ZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRDQ\LPPDQHQWRUWUDQVFHQGHQW*RGRUJRGV´
S7KHIDFWWKDWµQDWXUDOLVP¶DVDWHUPJRHVWKURXJKVXFKYDULDWLRQRIPHDQLQJWKURXJKRXWKLVWRU\VKRXOG
LQ LWVHOI SRLQW WR WKHKLVWRULFDO FRQWLQJHQF\RI VXSSRVHG µJUDQG¶ RU µXQLYHUVDO WUXWKV¶ about it.  In confining 
himself to the perennial problem of Aristotelian naturalism, Irwin fails to consider how different historical 
contexts inform the different philosophical uses of terms.  Once this is appreciated, his account may not be as 
supportive of the Cantabrigian approach as he claims.  Yet this in turn impedes a fuller textual and 
SKLORVRSKLFDODSSUHFLDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWHWKLFDO LGHDVQRWDV³DQWL-$ULVWRWHOLDQ´RU³QRQ-$ULVWRWHOLDQ´EXWIRU
their own merits, independently of any presumed unifying theme.   
,UZLQ¶V PHWKRGRORJLFDO RQHVLGHGQHVV FRXOG EH DOOHYLDWHG ZLWK JUHDWHU VHQVLWLYLW\ WR WKH KLVWRULFDO
context.  Ultimately, any synoptic history of ideas requires balance between the historical understanding 
provided by the Cantabrigian approach, and the critical examination of ideas supplied by a more philosophical 
approach that Irwin favours.  But to adopt some insights from the Cantabrigian approach need not imply we 
too must conclude, like Skinner, that all ideas are the ³HPERGLPHQW>V@RIDSDUWLFXODULQWHQWLRQRQDSDUWLFXODU
RFFDVLRQDGGUHVVHGWRWKHVROXWLRQRIDSDUWLFXODUSUREOHP´5  Excessive particularism is another extreme that 
should be avoided: the overcontextualisation of ideas is as myopic as the search for overarching narratives or 
universal philosophical truth.  Ultimately, both tendencies have to be overcome for a fuller picture to emerge 
of the history and development of moral philosophy.  It is perfectly legitimate to assume that some ethical 
questions resonate from one historical context to another.  But we risk misunderstanding how philosophHUV¶
                                                          
4
 Ibid., p. 52. 
5
 Ibid., p. 50. 
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own distinctive presuppositions may depart from ours, including our favoured particular answer to their 






6RIDU,KDYHLQGLFDWHGWKDW,UZLQ¶VDGRSWHGPHWKRGRORJy is not wholly successful.  This comes to the fore in 
his analysis of Christian reactions to the Greek moral outlook.  Orthodox readings of the history of philosophy 
usually understand the advent and spread of Christian morality, with its innovative doctrines of predestination, 
sin, divine grace and revelation, and free will, as a decisive point of departure from classical Greek views.  On 
this picture, the Christian outlook ± particularly in its Augustinian strand ± calls into question the Greek 
optimism that the moral good is immanently achievable through the cultivation of our natural rational 
capacities.6  Irwin, by contrast, focuses on points of convergence between the two traditions: for example, like 
Christianity, Stoicism expresses a degree of moral pessimism, and the Pauline division between the soul and 
flesh echoes the Platonic separation between the rational and non-UDWLRQDO%\WKHPVHOYHV,UZLQ¶VSRLQWVKHUH
DUHERWKDFFXUDWHDQG UHODWLYHO\XQFRQWURYHUVLDO 0RUHFRQWHQWLRXV LV ,UZLQ¶VGHSLFWLRQRIKRZ&KULVWLanity 
attempts to supplement and indeed, complete Greek morality; where these two traditions should be understood 
as, not antagonistic, but complementary to each other.   
 Irwin begins his section on Christian philosophy by pointing to what John Hare appropriately 
describes as the moral gap.7  ³$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH &KULVWLDQ DQDO\VLV´ ,UZLQ ZULWHV ³WKH PRUDO ODZ SRLQWV
EH\RQGLWVHOI>«@2QFHZHDLPDWWKLVHQGZHORRNIRUWKHUHVRXUFHVWRIXOILOLW2QFHZHUHFRJQL]HWKDWRXU
natural resources cannot fulfil it, we cannot reasonably refuse a hearing to Christian views about how to 
DFKLHYH WKH DLPV RI PRUDOLW\´ S   Distinctive to  the Christian ethical outlook is the postulated gap 
which exists between the moral ideal and human natural capacities to fulfil it.  Human practical activity points 
to the perfection of this moral ideal: we acknowledge it is as a valid and relevant solution to our flawed human 
                                                          
6
 2IFRXUVHWKLVLVDJURVVVLPSOLILFDWLRQ7R,UZLQ¶VFUHGLWKHGUDZVRXWWKHGLIIHUHQWZD\VLQZKLFKWKH*UHHNVFKRROV
theorise about the moral ideal and its connection to human practical reason. 
7
 See John Hare, 7KH0RUDO*DS.DQWLDQ(WKLFV+XPDQ/LPLWVDQG*RG¶V$VVLVWDQFH (Oxford: UP, 1997). 
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condition and we desire its achievement, but it nonetheless remains remote from our immediate grasp.  The 
moral ideal is something perfect and intuitively appeals to us; but our natural abilities fall short of its 
achievement, particularly since the Christian outlook introduces other crippling human impediments ± such as 
human sinfulness and the fallen nature of the flesh.  Added to these impediments are theological concerns 
VXUURXQGLQJ*RG¶VXOWLPDWHVRYHUHLJQW\$QGLWLVXOWLPDWHO\WKURXJKDSSHDOWRWKHRORJLFDOGRFWULQHVRIGLYLQH
grace, faith, and salvation, that Christian philosophers overcome the moral gap.  According to Irwin, Christian 
SHVVLPLVPDERXWWKHKXPDQDELOLW\WRIXOILOWKHPRUDOLGHDO³LVQRWWRUHMHFWWKHSHUIHFWLRQLVWDVSHFWVRI*UHHN
moral systems.  On the contrary, the perfectionist aspects support the Christian doctrines of justification and 
VDQFWLILFDWLRQ´SHPSKDVLVDGGHG,UZLQ¶VILUVWFODLPLVVXUHO\ULJKWDQGXQFRQWURYHUVLDOEXWWKHVHFRQG
claim goes too far.   
Though the Christian outlook agrees with Greek perfectionism, in so doing, it arguably points to a 
conception of morality which deviates sharply away from the views of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the 
Stoics.  No longer can we look to or build upon human rational nature as an immanent source of morality, nor 
can we rely on the social order to resolve our most pressing moral dilemmas.  Instead, doctrines of 
justification and sanctification point to a moral source outside of human rational control.  Moreover, the moral 
gap likely finds its most tragic expression in the mature views of Augustine, whose solution exposes deep 
WHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKH&KULVWLDQDQGFRQYHQWLRQDO*UHHNPRUDORXWORRN7KHZHDNQHVVRI,UZLQ¶VPHWKRGRORJ\
becomes particularly evident in his interpretation of Augustine.  Irwin downplays the acute tension between 
the Christian and Greek philosophical views, and emphasises strands of Augustinian thought which support 
this claim (p. 397).  But in doing so, he neglects those intractable antagonisms between these two positions.  
Let me examine this in more detail. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR ,UZLQ $XJXVWLQH ³EHORQgs to the tradition in Christian moral thinking that seeks to 
strengthen and to complete, not to destroy, the outlook of non-WKHRORJLFDOPRUDOWKHRU\´SHYHQPRUH
H[SOLFLWO\³$XJXVWLQH>LV@ILUPO\>ZLWKLQ@WKH*UHHNWUDGLWLRQ´S0RVWFRPPentators agree that neo-
3ODWRQLFRYHUWRQHVDQGLPDJHU\SUHGRPLQDWH$XJXVWLQH¶VHDUO\SUH-400 philosophical writings, expressing the 
VRXO¶V DVFHQW WRZDUGV *RG DQG VRPH LQLWLDO RSWLPLVP DERXW KRZ VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO JRRGV FRQWULEXWH WR
salvation.  But on IUZLQ¶V UHDGLQJ $XJXVWLQH UHMHFWV 3ODWRQLF GXDOLVP LQ IDYRXU RI D 6WRLF LQWHOOHFWXDOLVW
account of motivation, assent, choice and action (p. 407).  Unlike the Platonic and Aristotelian view, the 
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Stoics contend that passions are not pre-reflective states, but require rational judgement and assent.  In spite of 
$XJXVWLQH¶V YHUEDO FODLPV RI GLVDJUHHPHQW ZLWK WKHLU SRVLWLRQ ,UZLQ LQVLVWV WKDW KLV FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH ZLOO
indicates his implicit agreement with the Stoic account on this issue: passions have a motivational influence 
on agents, insofar as individuals assent to them (p. 407).   
The association between Stoic intellectualism and Augustine helps Irwin to downplay the Christian 
departure from the Greek outlook.  Ultimately, Irwin wants to deny ± contentiously ± that Augustine has a 
voluntarist conception of will.  Augustine allegedly DJUHHVZLWK WKH6WRLFDVVHUWLRQ³WKDWZHDUHQRW IUHH WR
UHMHFWWKHDSSDUHQWO\JUHDWHUJRRG´S .  According to Irwin, the will ± in terms of choice, consent, and 
assent ± is not a morally-QHXWUDOIDFXOW\RIYROLWLRQUDWKHU WKHZLOO¶V IUHHGRPLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFRQVHQW WR
RQH¶VJUHDWHURUDSSDUHQWJRRG,QWKHFDVHRIVLQWKHZLOOLVVWLOOUHVSRQVLEOHIRUDFWLRQLQVRIDUDVSDVVLRQV
and non-rational desires motivate free action only with our consent, yet our will cannot move us to act in ways 
independent of what we assume to be our greater good (p. 412).  The self-assertion of Adam and Eve was 
³PLVWDNHQEXWWKHLUSDUWLFXODUPLVWDNHZRXOGQRWKDYHDSSHDOHGWRWKHPLIWhey had not been rational agents 
SXUVXLQJWKHLURYHUDOOJRRG´SSLQFRPPLWWHGE\WKHZLOOLVWKHUHIRUHXQGHUVWRRGDVµPLVWDNHV¶RUIDOVH
beliefs.  These mistakes are nonetheless situated within a broader rational understanding of the good.  If 
AugXVWLQH¶VDFFRXQWRIZLOOHVVHQWLDOO\IROORZVDQLQWHOOHFWXDOLVWYLHZRIFKRLFHDQGDFWLRQDQGDJUHHVZLWK
the Stoic notion of assent of the passions, attributions of voluntarism to Augustine would appear as absurd as 
if we ascribed such a position to the 6WRLFV,QWHUSUHWHGWKLVZD\$XJXVWLQH³DFFHSWV6WRLFLQWHOOHFWXDOLVPDQG
DYRLGVYROXQWDULVP´S 
)RU ,UZLQ PRUHRYHU $XJXVWLQH¶V RYHUODS ZLWK RWKHU *UHHN WKLQNHUV LV QRW FRQILQHG WR WKH 6WRLFV
Irwin alleges that Augustine agrees with Plato and Aristotle on the intrinsic value of some external goods and 
SDJDQYLUWXHV6KDUHGDPRQJ3ODWR$ULVWRWOHDQG$XJXVWLQHLVD³WHOHRORJLFDOFULWHULRQIRUYLUWXH´:HFDQ
either adopt a moderately strict or extremely strict criterion: according to the former, an agent possesses a 
YLUWXHLIWKH\DFWRQWKH³PRUDOO\FRUUHFW´FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHXOWLPDWHHQGE\FRQWUDVWWKHODWWHUVWLSXODWHVWKDW
DQLQGLYLGXDOLVYLUWXRXVLIWKHLUDFWLRQLVJXLGHGE\D³ZKROO\FRUUHFW´FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHXOWLPDWHHQGS.  
If Augustine relies on the latter, he would be committed to the claim that, since pagans lack Christian faith ±  
which is constitutive of the ultimate end ± they therefore possess no virtues whatsoever.  It is only the agent 
who is justified and saved by faith, and whose soul is driven by love of God, who possesses true virtue.  On 
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,UZLQ¶V UHDGLQJ KRZHYHU $XJXVWLQH DFFHSWV DQG UHOLHV RQ WKH PRGHUDWH FULWHULRQ  7KLV LQGLFDWHV WKDW
Augustine makes concessions to the pagan conception of the ultimate end.  Pagan philosophers are correct to 
choose virtues for their intrinsic, non-instrumental value, though they ultimately violate their own standards, 
since they adhere to the virtues because they generate human esteem and approval, and mistakenly assume 
that happiness is achievable in this temporal life (p. 426).  Based on the moderate criterion, the pagan with 
virtues possesses genuine virtues.  We can therefore assume that both Christians and pagans share a common 
moral outlook (p. 415).   
,I,UZLQ¶VDFFRXQt of Augustinian virtue is true, if there is indeed some overlap between the pagan and 
the Christian about conceptions of the ultimate moral good, it is plausible that he follows other Greek thinkers 
in the belief that the social and political good is worthy of pursuit.  In statements which call to mind Aquinas 
more immediately than Augustine, Irwin writes: 
 
The cardinal virtues recognized by pagan moralists require the regulation of passions by rational desire 
IRFXVVHGRQRQH¶VRZQJRRGDQGWKHJRRGRIRWKers, especially the good of the society whose good is part of 
RQH¶V RZQ JRRG  Augustine agrees with this conception of the virtues, and claims that we are in a better 
position to practise them if we recognize our dependence on God for our growth in virtue, and the 
insufficiency of the goods of this world for our complete happiness.  (p. 432)  
 
,UZLQ FRQWLQXHV ³D &KULVWLDQ GRHV QRW ORVH LQWHUHVW LQ HDUWKO\ SHDFH LQ WKH OLJKW RI KHDYHQO\ SHDFH >@
Augustine [...] claims, against the Stoics, that external goods are really part of the human good, and that they 
DUH ZRUWK SXUVXLQJ WKRXJK WKH\ DUH VHFRQGDU\ WR WKH FRPSOHWH KDSSLQHVV RI WKH DIWHUOLIH´ S   5HDG
WKURXJK WKH OHQV RI WKH H[WUHPH FULWHULRQ UHDGLQJ $XJXVWLQH¶V GLYLVLRQ RI WKH WZR FLWLHV EDVed on their 
divergent objects of love would indeed imply a sharp departure from the Greek attitude towards the political 
JRRG %XW ,UZLQDVVXPHV WKDW$XJXVWLQH¶VPRGHUDWHYLHZDFFRPPRGDWHV LQGHHGYDOXHV WKHHDUWKO\SHDFH
brought through the political anGVRFLDOJRRGVLPLODUWR$TXLQDV¶&KULVWLDQ$ULVWRWHOLDQLVPWKHSROLWLFDOJRRG
is part of happiness, though it ultimately takes second place after the supernatural ultimate good.  Irwin 
WKHUHIRUH FODLPV WKDW $XJXVWLQH ³does not appeal directly to his own theological and moral outlook, but 
examines pagan moral philosophy by a standard that pagan philosophers accept; hence his critique deserves 
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WKHLUDWWHQWLRQIRUSKLORVRSKLFDOUHDVRQV´S7KHDVVXPSWLRQLVWKDWLI$XJXVWLQHGRHVUHO\KHDYLO\RQ
his theological views, his moral theory is problematic from a philosophical point of view.  Since, however, 
both Augustine and the pagan philosophers begin from similar presuppositions and are engaging with the 
same moral outlook, we can use both to supplement and enhance one other.   
There are several things one could say in response to Irwin.  Firstly, one should distinguish between 
HDUO\ DQG PDWXUH $XJXVWLQH ZKLFK OHDGV WR VFHSWLFLVP DERXW ,UZLQ¶V FODLP WKDW ERWK *UHHN DQG &KULVWLDQ
outlooks are relatively coherent.  Second, the claim is surely questionable that a theory of will exists prior to 
Augustine.  It is precisely his attachment to the Judaeo-Christian tradition that allows him to develop such a 
an account of practical motivation.  These points may appear as minute quibbles surrounding a reading of just 
RQHSDUWLFXODUSKLORVRSKHUKRZHYHUWKH\LOOXVWUDWHDGHHSHUSUREOHPZLWK,UZLQ¶VPHWKRGRORJ\6SHFLILFDOO\
,UZLQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGLQWHJUDWLRQRI$XJXVWLQHZLWKLQWKH*UHHNSKLORVRSKLFDOWUDGLWion perpetuates these 
PLVJXLGHG³P\WKRORJLHVRIFRKHUHQFH´ZLWKLQWKHKLVWRU\RILGHDV8  The illusion of philosophical unity and 
consistency is bought at the price of neglecting what is distinctive about different thinkers.  Let me examine 
these points in more detail; the first two I will discuss together.   
([DPLQHG LQ LVRODWLRQ $XJXVWLQH¶V SKLORVRSK\ HYROYHV RYHU WLPH DQG LV IDU IURP FRQVLVWHQW
&RPPHQWDWRUV DJUHH WKDW $XJXVWLQH¶V PDWXUH YLHZV V\PEROLVH D PDUNHG GHSDUWXUH DZD\ IURP WKH *UHHN
tradition.  This is significant to the extent that his more considered philosophical views do indeed appeal 
strongly to his theological beliefs, and as a result, some intractable contradictions emerge between his early 
and late philosophical positions.  These contradictions present difficulties where we are concerned to 
reconstruct coherent philosophical argument; however, they UHIOHFW $XJXVWLQH¶V RZQ LQWHUQDO GHEDWHV DQG
growing scepticism about the connection between providential purpose, and the historical city and church.9  
%\DURXQG$XJXVWLQH¶VYLHZVXQGHUJRDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZKHUHVWURQJHUHPSKDVLVLVSODFHGRQKRZWKH
achievement of the ultimate good is impeded by unavoidable human impairments.10  The neo-Platonic 
language and imagery remains throughout The Confessions, though it is now transferred onto a Christian 
platform: humans strive towards a perfect God, but  our reunification with Him is impossible through purely 
human, natural efforts.  Augustine puts his case even more strongly in the City of God, where the moral gap 




 See R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge: UP, 2007) p. 72. 
10
 See Ibid., pp. 82-7. 
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becomes much more acute.  Pagan virtues, and the social and political order are no longer indicative of moral 
progress towards perfection.  Earthly peace, achieved through adherence to pagan virtues, is riddled with 
disorder and conflictDQGLQVWHDGEHFRPHVDUHPLQGHURIKXPDQLW\¶VGLVWLQFWO\WUDJLFDQGIDOOHQFRQGLWLRQ11  
,QVKRUWVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOJRRGVQRORQJHUFRQWULEXWHWRWKHVRXO¶VJUDGXDODVFHQWWRZDUGV*RG 
7KLVFKDQJHFDQEHSDUWO\H[SODLQHGE\$XJXVWLQH¶VYROXQWDULVWSRsition, evident in both his account 
RIPRWLYDWLRQDQGRI*RG¶VVRYHUHLJQZLOODQGDXWKRULW\ $lbrecht Dihle provides a convincing case that a 
conception of the will ± as a volitional force independent of cognition and judgement ± did not exist prior to 
Augustine.12  Though Stoic assent may point to an inchoate voluntarism, their overriding cosmological view 
forestalls a notion of will as an independent faculty of choice.  The claim that the human mind is congruent 
with the natural, rational order is the main defining feature of Greek intellectualist theories of motivation.  Our 
moral practices and determinate reality are in agreement through the exercise of human reason, more 
specifically, through our rational insight into the natural order.  To put the same point differently, as 
participants of that order through natural law, our evaluations of moral, practical activities are based upon, and 
aligned within, that existing rational order.  In the case of the Stoics, the freedom of the sage comes about 
when one¶VOLIHDQGSUDFWLFHVDUHDUUDQJHGWKURXJKFKRLFHRIDQGDVVHQWWRDSSURSULDWHDQGYLUWXRXVHQGVLQ
accordance with the intelligible cosmological order.  The soul is the locale of choice, and its rational and 
irrational components contain both intellectual planning capacities and volitional force meant to be aligned to 
the systemic harmony of rational nature.  Crucially, the volitional force is never fully separable from cognitive 
judgements.13  Vice occurs when we can lack relevant knowledge, or the passional aspects of the soul lack 
proper habituation.   
If this rather simplistic account nonetheless accurately describes the Greek intellectualist account of 
PRWLYDWLRQ $XJXVWLQH¶V YLHZV GR LQGHHG UHSUHVHQW WKH ILUVW SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ FRJHQW WKHRU\ RI YROXQWDrism.  
Irwin contends that Augustinian freewill is analogous to Stoic conceptions of autonomy, whereby Augustine 
³LQWHQGVQRVLJQLILFDQWGRFWULQDOGLIIHUHQFH´UHJDUGOHVVRIKRZ³KHDWWULEXWHVDVVHQWWRWKHZLOOUDWKHUWKDQWR
reason, both in ordinary cognLWLRQDQGLQDFWLRQ´S%XW,GRQRWEHOLHYHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQDVVHQW




 See Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California, 1982). 
13
 Ibid., p. 63.  This becomes much more complex in the Aristotelian case, who believes that instances of akrasia and 
enkrasia occur precisely from conflict between rational and irrational parts of the soul. 
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and will amounts to merely a small quibble surrounding Stoic and Augustinian terminology.  Rather crucially, 
Augustine argues that the exercise of will or reason no longer signals our participation with the rational 
cosmological order: the order we see in nature is unbound to the divine order and eschatological purpose of a 
transcendent God.14  Unlike the Greek cosmological view outlined above, we cannot look to the natural 
rational order to provide insight into how we ought to order and structure our moral lives; instead, we must 
seek the will of God, which stands and rules over that natural rational order (De Trinitate 3.4.10).  Moreover, 
the human will is not necessarily aligned with the divine order; it can independently and deliberately choose 
against true knowledge of the good.  This would not be a case of akrasia, as in Aristotle, which is attributable 
WR WKH SRRU KDELWXDWLRQ RI WKH VRXO¶V QRQ-rational parts.  Irwin is, on one hand, correct to point out that 
Augustine concurs with the Stoic intellectualist conception of the good: Augustine does indeed attribute sin to 
ignorance or a lack of knowledge.  On the other hand, Augustine attributes to the will the free choice to seek 
NQRZOHGJHRI WKHJRRG LQ WKH ILUVWSODFH VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW IDLWK VWHPV IURPZLOO¶VFRQVHQW +HZULWHV LQ De 
libero arbitrio, ³>W@KHVRXOLVFKDUJHGZLWKJXLOWQRWEHFDXVHE\QDWXUHLWODFNVNQRZOHGJHRULVLQFDSDEOHEXW
because it did not make an effort to know and because it did not work adequately at acquiring the capability of 




VRXO FDQQRW UHFHLYH DQG KDYH WKHVH JLIWV«H[FHSW E\ FRQVHQWLQJ  $QG VR ZKDWHYHU LW KDV DQG ZKDWHYHU LW
receives comes from God, but to receive and to have comes from the one receiving and having.  (De spiritu et 
littera 34.60)16   
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 QWGLQ(OHRQRUH6WXPS³$XJXVWLQHRQ)UHH:LOO´LQThe Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: UP, 
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What Augustine says here points to, not just a terminological disagreement between him and his predecessors, 
but most fundamentally a systematic notion of the will as an independent faculty which does not necessarily 
obey reason or the passions, nor is deterministically orientated towards the ultimate good of faith in God. 
,QPLQLPLVLQJWKHVHSRLQWVZLWKLQ$XJXVWLQH¶VWKRXJKW,UZLQRYHUHPSKDVLVHVWKHFRKHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
the Greek and Christian traditions.  As a result, he underestimates the deep intellectual shift that occurs 
between the Greek conception of natural order, and the theological voluntarism predominating Biblical 
GHSLFWLRQVRI*RG¶VDXWKRULW\DQGEHFRPHVSUH-eminent in the Medieval period.  Irwin is correct to say that 
$XJXVWLQH¶VHDUO\LPPHUVLRQLQSDJDQSKLORVRSK\SRLQWVWRDFRKHVLYHRUGHUEHWZHHQGLYLQHDQGQDWXUDOODZ
however, he neglects to mention how Augustine ultimately retracts from this position, and asserts in its place 
KRZWKHLQVFUXWDELOLW\RI*RG¶VZLOOUHQGHUVFRPSOHWHO\VHSDUDWHWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHVHWZRRUGHUV:HFDQQR
ORQJHU ORRN DW WKH QDWXUDO UDWLRQDO RUGHU DV DQ DQDORJXH RU UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI *RG¶V RZQ UDWLRQDO ZLOO  $V
Augustine increasingly draws upon the Judaeo-Christian cosmological outlook, he begins to minimise human 
natural capacities to achieve the good in this temporal life, and appeals more strongly to theological doctrines 
RIJUDFHDQGSUHGHVWLQDWLRQ,QLWVHOIWKHZLOO¶VIUHHFKRLFHWRseek faith and knowledge of the good is a gift 
from the will of God.  Heavily debated is whether Augustine successfully reconciles his voluntarist account of 
human motivation, and his theological voluntarism in terms of predestination and grace; arguably Augustine 
fails in his attempts.17  Nonetheless, his conception of will becomes a crucial point of departure for 
succeeding theories of natural law, and provides the framework of discussion for questions regarding the 
priority of will over natural law, or viFHYHUVD$XJXVWLQH¶VGHEDWHZLWKLQKLPVHOIKLVRZQH[RGXVDZD\IURP
the Greek conception of morality, casts a long historical shadow, leading to conceptions of moral obligation, 
and social and political authority which differ from the Greek model, illustrated particularly in Hobbesian 





DOOXUH RI ZKDW 6NLQQHU FDOOV WKH µP\WKRORJ\ RI FRKHUHQFH¶  $XJXVWLQH¶V LQWHUQDO LQFRQVistencies are 




minimised, giving the misleading impression not only that his philosophy is internally constant and 
systematic, but also that it fits relatively unproblematically within the Greek tradition of moral philosophy.  
The mythology of coherence is attractive because it provides us the means by which we can reach common 
philosophical ground.  Irwin attributes to Augustine an implicit endorsement of various aspects of pagan 
philosophy in hopes that a more fruitful philosophical discussion could be had if deep and irreconcilable 
differences are minimised.  On this picture, much less than forward a highly original moral argument which 
reflects the unique social context and theological outlook available to him, Augustine merely progresses the 
discussion that precedes him.  We may understand why Irwin assumes that we need to do this.  If 
philosophers with seemingly deep theological or metaphysical commitments in fact begin from philosophical 
SUHPLVHV PRVW RI XV FDQ UHDVRQDEO\ DFFHSW WKHVH WKLQNHUV DUH µUHVFXHG¶ IURP WKHLU SRWHQWLDOO\ LPSODXVLEOH
frameworks.  In so doing we find our own thinking reassuringly reflected back to us in that of our 
predecessors.  Indeed, this is a deeply tempting strategy, in vogue within many moral philosophical circles 
such as Rawlsian liberal theory.   
Ultimately, this to me seems a misguided strategy: any historical account of the development of ethics 
would need to understand how philosophers are not necessarily conversing in the same language or horizon of 
meaning, and as a result, come up with entirely unique answers to our questions about morality.  In particular, 
WKLV VHHPV WR EH *DGDPHU¶V LQVLJKW RQ D KHUPHQHXWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH ZKHQ KH VD\V ³>L@W LV WKH KLVWRULFDOO\
experienced consciousness that, by renouncing the chimera of perfect enlightenment, is open to the 
H[SHULHQFH RI KLVWRU\ >«@ >,@WV UHDOL]DWLRQ >LV@ WKH IXVLRQ RI KRUL]RQV RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ ZKLFK LV ZKDW
PHGLDWHV EHWZHHQ WKH WH[W DQG LWV LQWHUSUHWHU´18  ,UZLQ¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW ZH FDQ EH EHWWHU VHUYHG E\
conferring coherence, rather than difference, onto the history of ethics, is problematic, as it assumes that it is 
possible to achieve a disengaged, Archimedean vantage point of philosophical judgement.  If we 
automatically assume coherence and unity, we close oXUVHOYHVIURPVXFKµIXVLRQVRIKRUL]RQV¶DQGJHQXLQH
understanding.  To put this point in more concrete terms, Skinner is correct to note how difference and 
incoherence can also be interesting, informative, and philosophically fruitful, if only to show how the history 
of ethics is not a linear, progressive development towards, say, the advancement of reason, nor the gradual 
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elimination of religious belief towards a scientific naturalism we can more readily accept, nor ± LQ ,UZLQ¶V
case ± the critical development and refinement of Aristotelian naturalism.  Rather, awareness of historical 
contingency, of how this breeds difference rather than unity, have normative significance insofar that we 
come to the recognition how divergent and perhaps more idiosyncratic horizons of meaning are just as 
legitimate as many others, and equally worthy of philosophical consideration.19 
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